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INTRODUCTION
In his review of Kill Bill Volume I, Roger Ebert describes the film as
"kind of brilliant," and then proceeds to quote Manny Farber's definition of
auteur theory: "A bunch of guys standing around trying to catch someone
shoving art up into the crevices of dreck."1 After reading The Agency Class
Action,2 I felt like I had caught the authors not exactly shoving art up into, but
certainly extracting art out of, the crevices of dreck.
The dreck in this case is the class action, arguably the most controversial
procedure in civil litigation. The art is the lessons the authors believe the class
action can teach us. One of the coauthors, Adam Zimmerman, recently applied
the lessons of the class action to the criminal context.3 Here Zimmerman and
his coauthor, Michael Sant'Ambrogio, turn their attention to administrative
law. 4 Other scholars have recognized the similarities of the class action to
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. Email:
scamposialaw.miami.edu. Phone: (617) 674-7509. Many thanks to Michael Froomkin, Dennis
Lynch, and Adam Zimmerman for their helpful comments, and Sam Reitz for her excellent edits.
All errors are mine.
1. Roger Ebert, Kill Bill Volume 1, Chicago Trib. (Oct. 10, 2003),
http://rogerebert.suntimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20031010/REVIEWS/310100304/102
3.
2. Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
Colum. L. Rev. 1992 (2012) [hereinafter Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency].
3. Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1385 (2011).
4. Admittedly, Zimmerman previously analyzed the intersection of class actions and
administrative law in the context of large settlement funds. See Adam S. Zimmerman,
Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 500 (2011). This earlier article resulted in his article
applying class action insights to the criminal law context. See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 3.
However, in The Agency Class Action, Zimmerman and Sant'Ambrogio apply class action
insights directly to administrative law as a whole. Many thanks to Adam Zimmerman for
clarifying this.
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administrative law, perhaps most famously the late Richard Nagareda.5 But
Zimmerman and Sant'Ambrogio, unlike Nagareda and others, do not use
administrative law to criticize the class action. Instead, they use the class
action to suggest reforms to administrative law. 6 It is an approach that is equal
parts creative, audacious, and heretical. This is just a long way of saying that I
think the Article is "kind of brilliant."
This Response first situates The Agency Class Action within the literature
on the class action. It is not an exaggeration to say that the Article is borderline
heretical given the current animosity toward the class action. This is not to say
that Zimmerman and Sant'Ambrogio view the class action as a panacea.
Instead, they move the debate forward by focusing not on the bad of the class
action but the good. Indeed, the Article is a throwback to a view of the class
action as an important complement to administrative enforcement.
This Response then suggests that, whether the authors are conscious of it
or not (and I think they are), the Article contains a much deeper critique of
some basic premises that underlie both the law of civil procedure and
administrative law. As I have argued in my own work, the class action is not
only a source of wisdom, but it upends many common sense notions that
underlie a great deal of legal doctrine on civil procedure, most notably the
fetish many courts and scholars have with protecting litigant autonomy. 7 Here,
I want to point out that Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's description of
administrative law's pathologies, and their suggested reforms, implicitly reject
a parallel commonly accepted premise of administrative law-the concern with
"replacing individual hearings with a potentially faceless, unresponsive
bureaucracy." 8 In my view, the Article celebrates the benefits of "faceless ...
bureaucracy."
I. THE CLASS ACTION IS THE SOLUTION!
Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman modestly describe the contribution of
their Article as "natural, albeit novel."9 The natural part is easy to understand.
The modern class action, like the modern administrative state, is a product of
the New Deal. Although class actions, in one form or another, have been
5. See Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 899,
945-52 (1996) [hereinafter Nagareda, Turning] (arguing "[i]n evaluating the fairness of a mass
tort settlement under Rule 23(e), courts should draw upon the ... framework for judicial review
in administrative law"); see also Richard A. Nagareda, Class Actions in the Administrative State:
Kalven and Rosenfield Revisited, 75 U. Chi. L. Rev. 603, 605 (2008) [hereinafter Nagareda,
Revisited] (arguing class actions should be designed consistent with "institutional boundaries on
regulatory power" imposed on administrative agencies).
6. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 2002 (recognizing Article
"1turn[s] the tables to ask what agencies can learn from complex litigation"); id. at 2066 (noting
Article's proposed agency class action "borrow[s] rules from private class action litigation to
better resolve disputes within a public agency").
7. Sergio J. Campos, Mass Torts and Due Process, 65 Vand. L. Rev. 1059 (2012)
[hereinafter Campos, Mass Torts]; Sergio J. Campos, Proof of Classwide Injury, 37 Brook. J. Int'l
L. 751 (2012) [hereinafter Campos, Proof].
8. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 2001.
9. Id. at 2002.
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around for centuries,' 0 the contemporary class action did not enter the
American legal scene until the tail end of the New Deal, roughly around the
promulgation of the first Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.11
As Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman point out, "the modern administrative
state, like the class action, originally developed in response to intractable
disputes involving large groups of people."1 2 For example, in their seminal
article The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, published in 1941, Harry
Kalven, Jr. and Maurice Rosenfield acknowledged the emergence of
administrative law as a means to deal with harm caused to a large number of
dispersed persons.13 In their words, "[a]dministrative law removes the
obstacles of insufficient funds and insufficient knowledge by shifting the
responsibility for protecting the interests of the individuals comprising the
group to a public body which has ample funds and adequate powers of
investigation." 14 However, Kalven and Rosenfield noted that agencies were
limited in providing retrospective relief, and thus, much as Sant'Ambrogio and
Zimmerman do in their own Article, Kalven and Rosenfield "explore[d] the
possibilities of revitalizing private litigation to fashion an effective means of
group redress" through class action procedures. 15
Kalven and Rosenfield's view of the class action became formally
recognized with the 1966 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.
The Amendments changed Rule 23 to permit class actions involving damage
remedies. 16 According to Ben Kaplan, the reporter for the 1966 Amendments,
the Rules were amended to help vindicate "the rights of groups of people who
individually would be without effective strength to bring their opponents into
court at all." 17 Shortly after adoption of the 1966 Amendments, the class action
became known as a tool to supplement administrative enforcement in a number
of subject areas.18 In fact, "[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that
10. See Stephen C. Yeazell, From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modem Class Action 8,
10 (1987) (discussing history of class action procedures).
11. See Nagareda, Revisited, supra note 5, at 608 ("Key features of the landscape for class
actions today are the by-products of larger changes wrought by the 1938 Rules.").
12. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1999 (citing sources).
13. 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941).
14. Id. at 686.
15. Id. at 687; cf Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 2000 (noting
"current tools of administrative law-including rulemaking, stare decisis, attorneys' fees, and
federal court class actions-fail groups of people seeking the same kinds of retrospective relief').
16. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966) (Advisory Committee's
note).
17. Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 497, 497 (1969)
(discussing Rule 23(b)(3) category, which allows for class actions for damage remedies).
18. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (noting in context
of class action that "[w]hen the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was passed, it was evident that
enforcement would prove difficult and that the Nation would have to rely in part upon private
litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with the law"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442
U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (rejecting argument that "allowing class actions to be brought by retail
consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant burden to the already crowded dockets of
the federal courts," because "[t]hese private suits provide a significant supplement to the limited
22 [Vol. 113:20
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public agencies cannot themselves detect and deter all wrongdoing," making
private suits like the class action "an important complement to public
enforcement." 19
If it is indeed "natural" to view the class action as a supplement to
administrative law efforts to deal with harm to large, dispersed groups, then
Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's "novel" contribution should not be novel, at
least not in 2013. But over time the class action has transformed from a
complement to administrative law into a poor substitute for it. For whatever
reason, we went from Kalven and Rosenfield recognizing the class action as a
natural extension of the administrative state to the class action representing, in
a sense, the Goofus to administrative law's Gallant.20
The history of that transformation is certainly beyond the scope of this
Response, and I will not attempt it here. But certainly one watershed moment
occurred in 1997 when the Supreme Court decided Amchem Products, Inc. v.
Windsor, a case in which the Court rejected a global class action settlement of
tort claims arising from asbestos exposure. 2 1 The Court began its majority
opinion by describing the lower courts' efforts "to work with the procedural
tools available to improve management of federal asbestos litigation," but the
Court did so almost pejoratively. 22 In the Court's view, the solution to taming
asbestos litigation, which involved literally millions of victims exposed to
asbestos over several decades, 23 was not to use procedural tools like the class
action.
Instead, the Court quoted at length from a report prepared by the United
States Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, which
proposed "federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute-resolution
scheme." 24 Two years later, in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., which involved a
different global class action settlement of asbestos claims, the Court flat out
stated that asbestos litigation "defies customary judicial administration and
calls for national legislation" 2 5 and noted glumly that "[t]o date Congress has
not responded." 26
Amchem and Ortiz both brought us a long way from Kalven and
Rosenfield's optimism that the class action could help lighten the load of an
resources available to the Department of Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring
violations").
19. 2 William B. Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 8 (5th ed. 2011) (citing sources).
20. See, e.g., Anni Matsick, Goofus and Gallant, Highlights for Children, Sept. 2004, at 9
(illustrating classic children's cartoon in which Goofus always demonstrates poor behavior and
Gallant demonstrates proper behavior).
21. 521 U.S. 591 (1997).
22. Id. at 599.
23. Id. at 597 (noting "class proposed for certification potentially encompasses hundreds of
thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals tied together by this commonality: Each was, or some
day may be, adversely affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured by one or
more of 20 companies," which were defendants in lower courts).
24. Id. at 598 (citing Report of the Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation 3, 27-35 (Mar. 1991)).
25. 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).
26. Id. at 821 n.1.
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overextended administrative state. In both opinions the Supreme Court literally
asked the administrative state to save us from the sprawling monster that is the
class action.
The Court has only grown more annoyed with the class action over time.
In Amchem, the Court recognized that the " [t]he policy at the very core of the
class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting
his or her rights." 27 The Court also suggested that class actions generally
should be certified in "cases alleging consumer or securities fraud or violations
of the antitrust laws." 28 In the past two years alone, however, the Court has
granted certiorari to address the appropriateness of class actions in securities, 29
antitrust, 30 consumer protection, 31 and civil rights 32 litigation. In fact, these
are some of the very areas of the law that Kalven and Rosenfield had hoped
would "draw upon" both class actions and administrative enforcement,
"permitting both to develop side by side to check and complement each
other." 33
The scholarship on class actions has mirrored the Supreme Court's
increasing distaste for the class action. The giant in this field is the late Richard
Nagareda, who made significant and influential contributions to the class
action literature. 34 Nagareda argued throughout his scholarship that "the
27. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 617 (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344
(1997)).
28. Id. at 625 (noting "[p]redominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging
consumer or securities fraud or violations of the antitrust laws" (citing 1966 Advisory Committee
Notes)).
29. E.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 132 S. Ct. 2742 (2012) (No. 11-
1085) (granting certiorari in securities fraud class action); see also Amgen, Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Trust Funds, SCOTUSblog, at http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/amgen-inc-v-
connecticut-retirement-plans-and-trust-funds/ (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last
visited Jan. 17, 2013) (naming issues in case as whether, among other things, "in a
misrepresentation case under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, the district court
must require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-
market theory"); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011) (holding that
use of fraud-on-the-market theory in securities class action did not require proof of loss
causation).
30. E.g., Comcastv. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 24 (2012) (No. 11-864) (granting certiorari in
antitrust class action on issue "whether a district court may certify a class action without resolving
whether the plaintiff class has introduced admissible evidence, including expert testimony, to
show that the case is susceptible to awarding damages on a class-wide basis").
31. E.g., Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 90 (2012) (No. 11-1450) (granting
certiorari on whether class representative asserting claims insurer underpaid class can avoid
removal under the Class Action Fairness Act by stipulating to lower damages); AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (affirming validity of class action waivers in
arbitration agreements despite finding of unconscionability under state law).
32. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (reversing certification of
class action asserting gender discrimination claims under Title VII).
33. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 684 (discussing securities and antitrust
enforcement); id. at 721 (noting class actions and administrative law would develop "side by
side").
34. Along with being a reporter to the American Law Institute's recently completed
Principles of the Law ofAggregate Litigation (2010), Nagareda was cited heavily in the Supreme
24 [Vol. 113:20
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modem class action has come to operate as a rival to public lawmaking rather
than a procedural afterthought," with the class action a decidedly inferior
rival.3 5 Thus, Nagareda, like the Supreme Court, has argued that, ideally, the
class actions should be preempted in important respects by administrative
law. 36 At the very least, Nagareda and others have argued that class actions
should be reviewed under the standards judges use to review administrative
action. 37 Again, the class action and administrative law are not seen as tools
"to check and complement each other," 38 but as unequal substitutes.
In Amchem, the Court cited approvingly to a dissent to the Ad Hoc
Committee report which proposed "passage by Congress of an administrative
claims procedure similar to the Black Lung legislation." 39 So imagine my
surprise at seeing Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman include the Black Lung
Benefits Plan within the Article's parade of horribles that could use some help
from the class action. 40 As Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman point out, "many
miners do not have the resources to develop sound evidence for their black
lung cases, in contrast to mine operators, who have well-financed teams of
defense attorneys with highly trained medical experts capable of regularly
defeating unrepresented applicants." 4 1 They also note that "[p]laintiff's
attorneys frequently refuse miners' claims because-when adjudicated
Court's opinion in the Wal-Mart case. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Richard A.
Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97, 131 32
(2009)). Nagareda has also written an influential casebook on aggregate litigation. Richard A.
Nagareda, The Law of Class Actions and Other Aggregate Litigation (2009). Although I criticize
his work here, I do so with the utmost respect to his considerable achievements.
35. Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action,
103 Colum. L. Rev. 149, 153 (2003).
36. E.g., Richard A. Nagareda, Mass Torts in a World of Settlement 254 (2007) [hereinafter
Nagareda, Mass Torts] (setting forth "leveraging proposal" concerning fee structure of class
action attorneys that would be implemented by "administrative state").
37. E.g., Nagareda, Turning, supra note 5, at 945 (arguing that "courts should analyze the
creation of private administrative regimes for mass torts in a manner similar to that already
developed for scrutiny of their public regulatory counterparts"); see also Mark Moller, Class
Action Lawmaking: An Administrative Law Model, 11 Tex. Rev. L. & Pol. 39, 45 (2006)
(analogizing class actions to private administrative agencies and arguing that question of scope of
statute to permit class actions be subject to Chevron deference); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 Yale L.J. 27, 112-13 (2003) (proposing "judges
model their review of class settlements after their review of administrative action," including hard
look at record).
38. Kalven & Rosenfield, supra note 13, at 721.
39. AmchemProds., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997) (quoting Report of the
Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation 42 (Mar. 1991) (Hogan, J.,
dissenting)).
40. See Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1996 (discussing Black
Lung Benefits Program). The Black Lung Benefits Program was established pursuant to the Black
Lung Benefits Act of 1973, which provides benefits and an administrative forum for persons
"totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis [black lung disease] arising out of employment in one or
more of the Nation's coal mines." 30 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006).
41. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1996 (citing U.S. Gov't
Accountability Office, GAO-10-7, Black Lung Benefits Program: Administrative and Structural
Changes Could Improve Miners' Ability to Pursue Claims 30, available at http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/dl07.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review)).
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individually-they take too much money and time to resolve." 42 Ironically, in
the Black Lung context and many others, administrative law looks far from
superior to the class action.
One major contribution of the Article is to catalog the numerous
pathologies of agency adjudication. The first half of the Article reads like a
long-lost Kafka novel. For example, there are literally hundreds of thousands
of cases pending in immigration courts, but only 260 immigration
administrative law judges ("ALJs") nationwide. 43 The Article also describes
wait times of up to four years to have claims resolved. 44 Perhaps most sadly,
the Article points out that some settlement proceeds, which may be in the
hundreds of millions of dollars, are sometimes distributed haphazardly with no
formal rules, if they are distributed at all. 45
As the first half of the Article discusses in great and page-turning detail,
the lack of class action and similar aggregate procedures causes problems
across a broad swath of subject areas, in cases involving what Zimmerman and
Sant'Ambrogio call "public rights," "private rights," and "agency
restitution." 46 Indeed, if anyone takes anything from this Article, it is the clear
conclusion that administrative law is far from the solution that the Supreme
Court and scholars have imagined.
II. IS INDIVIDUALISM THE PROBLEM?
So how did administrative law become both the preferred method of
dealing with dispersed harm, at least as compared to the loathsome class
action, and yet end up being so dysfunctional? I think that the authors'
proposed reform, the "agency class action," has embedded within it a critique
of premises shared by both class action law and administrative law that have
led to this outcome. But to see why, it is worth stepping back to see how the
class action facilitates the enforcement of rights that affect a large group of
dispersed victims.
As I have argued elsewhere, the class action can be understood as a trust
device to deal with disputes involving asymmetric stakes. 47 Take, for example,
litigation involving small claims. In small claims litigation, no individual
plaintiff has an incentive to bring suit because the costs outweigh any possible
benefit-"only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30."48 In contrast to the
numerous plaintiffs, the defendant in small claims litigation has a significant
interest in investing in common issues of liability. If the defendant can win on
a common issue against one plaintiff, he almost certainly will win against all of
42. Id.
43. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1994 & n.6.
44. Id. at 1995 (discussing claims for benefits to Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA")).
45. Id. at 1996 (discussing settlement to compensate distressed homeowners negotiated by
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")).
46. Id. at 2002-16.
47. Campos, Proof, supra note 7, at 776-77; Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1076-79.
48. Carnegie v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.).
26 [Vol. 113:20
CLASS ACTIONS ALL THE WAY DOWN 27
the others, thereby reducing or eliminating all of the liability associated with
that issue.4 9
In other words, the stakes are asymmetric-the defendant cares more
about common issues than any one plaintiff. As a result, you get a situation
much like the one Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman describe in the Black Lung
context, where mine operators invest heavily in common issues to "regularly
defeat[] unrepresented applicants."5 0 The authors, in fact, recognize that
aggregation "provides more access by granting plaintiffs the same 'economies
of scale' as well-financed defendants."5 1
But, as I have argued elsewhere, the class action provides the plaintiffs the
same economies of scale as the defendant because the class action, in effect,
makes the class attorney the trustee of the claims. 52 In other words, the class
action gives the class attorney, like a trustee, dispositive control over the
claims, plus a percentage interest in any recovery, to motivate the attorney to
maximize the aggregate recovery for the class. 53 If the class as a whole wins,
then the class attorney wins, and because the class attorney can spread costs
among all of the plaintiffs, 54 she will have the same incentives to invest in
common issues as the defendant.
The fee arrangement, as even Nagareda recognized, is crucial to
motivating a class attorney to bring a class action. 55 But the taking of
dispositive control away from the plaintiffs is equally crucial. If the plaintiffs
retain control over their individual claims, then collective action problems will
prevent the plaintiffs from having the same economies of scale as the
defendant. Plaintiffs most likely will fail to aggregate sufficiently to share
costs, or they may free-ride on the investments of other plaintiffs. 56 Thus,
allowing the plaintiffs to retain control over their claims is self-defeating. It
creates a situation where the mine operators always win and the Black Lung
sufferers cannot even get an attorney to work on their individual case. 57
49. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1075-76 (discussing similar example in mass tort
litigation) (citing David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and
Plaintiffs Don't, 37 Harv. J. on Legis. 393, 399-400 (2000)).
50. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1996.
51. Id. at 2037 (citing sources).
52. Campos, Proof, supra note 7, at 772-75; Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1078-79;
see also Sergio J. Campos, Class Actions and Justiciability (unpublished draft 2012) (discussing
trust function of class action) (on file with Columbia Law Review).
53. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1078-79; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (providing
procedures for attorneys concerning "settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise" of class
action, which do not require consent of all class members); Am. Law Inst., Principles of the Law
of Aggregate Litigation § 3.13(a) cmt. b (2010) (noting preference of courts for "percentage
method" to compensate class attorneys).
54. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1077 (noting class action attorney can spread
costs to class members under common-fund doctrine).
55. Nagareda, Mass Torts, supra note 36, at 219-49 (proposing alternative fee structure to
avoid conflicts among class members).
56. Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1079-81 (discussing these collective action
problems).
57. In my prior writings I have focused on the deterrence function of the class action, but it
is obvious that the scale advantages of the class action greatly improve the compensation
20131
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But despite the self-defeating nature of individual control over the claim
in cases involving asymmetric stakes, courts and scholars have insisted on
protecting that control no matter what. In Ortiz, for example, the Court rejected
a proposed mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B) 58 to settle the
asbestos claims, in part because "objectors to the collectivism of a mandatory
subdivision (b)(1)(B) action have no inherent right to abstain."59 After all, the
Court has repeatedly stated that we have a "deep-rooted historic tradition that
everyone should have his own day in court." 60
Similarly, Nagareda has criticized all class actions because they inherently
diminish a plaintiff s control over her claim, which is, at the end of the day, the
client's "property."61 Indeed, for Nagareda, it is this feature of the class action
that gives the procedure its "administrative" character:
Apart from situations of client consent, the administration of mass
tort claims stand to act upon an individual's right to sue not in the
manner of a real estate agent retained by contract but, rather, like a
local government condemning real property and providing "just
compensation" to the property owner. 62
But this feature of the class action is also its most problematic because it
appropriates each plaintiff's right to sue without her consent. For Nagareda,
"[c]lass members' preexisting rights to sue truly must be purchased rather than
simply appropriated, in keeping with their status as a form of property." 63
Indeed, any form of diminishing the claim without the consent of the
plaintiffs is forbidden. For example, Nagareda rejects the use of average
awards in class actions to ensure the equitable distribution of damages to the
plaintiffs and to prevent assessing excessive punitive damages on the
defendant. For Nagareda, "[t]he conception of the right to sue as an individual
right ... commits the tort system to the prospect that some individuals may
seek anomalously high recoveries." 64
This view of the right to sue as an almost inviolable property right largely
explains the preference for administrative law over the class action. Whereas
administrative law is public, and administrators are subject to electoral
accountability (at least at a remove), there is no such democratic accountability
for the class attorney. The class attorney is self-appointed and only cares about
the class insofar as doing so will make her more money. Thus, Nagareda, in
discussing Kalven and Rosenfield, noted that both failed to appreciate the
provided by litigation. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1084-85 (noting importance of
economies of scale to both compensation and deterrence).
58. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (permitting mandatory class action if individual litigation
would, "as a practical matter ... be dispositive" of the claims or nonparties).
59. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846-47 (1999) (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 846; see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892-93 (2008) (quoting Richards v.
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996)) (quoting same language); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755, 761 (1989) (quoting same language).
61. Nagareda, Mass Torts, supra note 36, at 60 (noting "the client's right to sue is her
righf).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 159.
64. Id. at 160.
289 [Vol. 113:20
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"tension between the class action device as a vehicle for privatized
enforcement of legal rights and the allocation of authority in the United
States." 65 Indeed, scholars who have not analogized the class action to
administrative proceedings nevertheless agree with Nagareda that "the
relationship between class members and class representatives" can be
understood "as one between the representatives (the governors) and the
members (the governed)." 66
There is a certain appeal to the position of the Court and Nagareda in
recognizing the right to sue as an inviolable property right that cannot be taken
away without the client's consent or some other legitimate use of force. But the
realities of both administrative enforcement and class action practice show the
perverse results of this view. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman point out early
in the Article that agencies "routinely ignore group-wide concerns raised in
agency adjudication[s]" in part because "the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) ... as far back as 1946, established rules for individualized
administrative hearings." 67 Thus, respect for a "day in court" is also protected
stringently in the administrative law context, and, as detailed in the Article, the
result has been a hellish landscape of inconsistent decisions, protracted
proceedings, and duplicative proceedings over common issues that drain
agency resources.
This is, in my view, the real bite of the Article. Like in the class action
context, administrative law protects the right to a "day in court" almost
absolutely, 6 8 which is one major cause of the perverse results outlined in the
Article. Thus, the same procedural feature that make class actions
inappropriate-the taking away of the right of each claimant to use her "day in
court" as she sees fit-is equally criticized in administrative law. But more
importantly, this very feature of the class action turns out to be the feature that,
in Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's view, is needed to solve the pathologies
they describe.
In the second half of the Article, Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman propose
an "agency class action" that borrows features from current class action law
and the law of multidistrict litigation.6 9 In outlining their proposal, the authors
are quick to recognize that "large cases create new risks," which include,
among other things, "replacing individual hearings with a potentially faceless,
unresponsive bureaucracy" that "stray[s] from democratic ideals." 70 Thus, the
authors are quick to temper their proposal to protect each claimant's "day in
65. Nagareda, Revisited, supra note 5, at 604-05.
66. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Governing Securities Class Actions, 80 U. Cin. L. Rev. 299,
305-06 (2011) (citing Samuel Issacharoff, Governance and Legitimacy in the Law of Class
Actions, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 337, 366; Nagareda, Revisited, supra note 5, at 638).
67. Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman, Agency, supra note 2, at 1997-98 (citing sources).
68. Indeed, much of the literature on administrative due process has equally focused on
litigant autonomy as an important value. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Due Process in the
Administrative State 158 253 (1985) (discussing importance of protecting claimant's autonomy
in designing administrative procedures).
69. Id. at 2035-36 (introducing proposal).
70. Id. at 2038-39.
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court." 7 Given the hostility to this very feature of the class action in both the
class action and administrative law context, this is a smart move.
But their proposal only works if it "replac [es] individual hearings with a
potentially faceless . . . bureaucracy." For example, Sant'Ambrogio and
Zimmerman argue that one crucial benefit of the agency class action is that it
would allow agencies to avoid duplicative efforts to resolve common issues.
Instead, as in class actions, the agency can resolve the issues in one fell swoop,
giving the agency "the first bite at solving categories of common problems that
otherwise may never receive a hearing in federal court or-worse yet-reach
federal court without counsel capable of developing a factual record that
describes the system-wide harm." 72 But doesn't that mean that some
claimant's will not have their day in court? According to Sant'Ambrogio and
Zimmerman, "[c]ourts have long recognized that agencies may bind parties to
common findings of law or fact without individualized hearings without
violating due process." 73
A better example is Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's proposal to allow
for the use of statistical evidence and sampling to determine factual issues. The
benefit of using such evidence would mean more consistent factual findings
among claimants, but that would also mean that claimants would, particularly
in aggregate settlements, receive an average award. 74 Of course,
Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman dutifully note, following Nagareda and
others, that "aggregate litigation threatens accuracy by 'averaging' claim
values among parties with different injuries or by favoring the interests of
some plaintiffs over others." 75 But, as they correctly recognize, "[m]ass
adjudication already arguably promotes accuracy through the aggregation
process itself."76 Not only do you get the benefit of the law of large numbers,
which improves accuracy across a population,77 but a "rough justice"
procedure like sampling "lowers costs, speeds data collection, and, because the
sample surveyed is smaller, ensures higher quality and more consistency in the
information gathered."78
As I have argued elsewhere, due process may protect a claimant's
property interest in her claim, but it is also flexible enough to give way when
protecting that interest would defeat other important interests, such as the right
to avoid the unlawful conduct that caused the claim in the first place and the
right to timely compensation. 79 As noted by the old due process chestnut
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., a right to notice is not required
by due process if it "dissipate[s] [the] advantages" of the very thing that notice
71. Id. at 2039-40.
72. Id. at 2053.
73. Id. at 2055 (citing sources).
74. Id. at 2060-63.
75. Id. at 2060.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2061.
79. See Campos, Mass Torts, supra note 7, at 1110-14.
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is meant to protect. 80 Despite Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's language to
the contrary, it is refreshing to see them not protect a claimant's control over a
claim when it would not otherwise make sense to do so. The funny thing is that
scholars like Nagareda may even go for the proposed "agency class action" in
the Article. Unlike the purely private class action, an agency class action is
authorized by a publicly accountable agency, which, in Nagareda's view,
legitimizes the taking of each claimant's autonomy over her day in court. 8'
But, arguably, the freedom to diminish litigant autonomy should apply
equally in the class action context. After all, it is bizarre to apply democratic
principles to litigation, as if democracy must prevail in every context. 82 The
better approach, one exemplified by Sant'Ambrogio and Zimmerman's fine
Article, and one recognized by the law, is to calibrate the procedure to "fairly
insure[] the protection of the interests" at stake. 83 For me, at least, that is the
fundamental lesson class action law teaches us.
CONCLUSION
Both the pathologies in administrative law that Sant'Ambrogio and
Zimmerman identify and the benefits of the class action that they propose are
based on a sustained examination of the on-the-ground experience of ALJs,
agencies, attorneys, and district courts trying to make the most of difficult
situations. The Article is a testament to solving legal problems not by looking
up to the clouds, but all the way down.
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80. 339 U.S. 306, 317-18 (1950) (holding newspaper publication is sufficient to notify
unknown, contingent beneficiaries of trust fund of proceeding to preclude their breach of
fiduciary duty claims).
81. Cf. Nagareda, Mass Torts, supra note 36, at 254 (noting administrative preemption is
necessary for his leveraging proposal given impact of proposal on each plaintiff's right to sue).
82. For an obvious example, consider parents, who, like me, are all benevolent dictators.
83. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42-43 (1940) (discussing due process standard for class
actions).
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